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Private Participation in the Control of Public Spending - The Multi-Level  Sub-
sidy Regimes 
 
A.  Introduction, Background, The Questions 
 
This paper is on the role of private parties in the laws regulating subsidies. The law of subsi-
dies is a multi-level phenomenon. Governments on the supranational, national, regional and 
local levels grant subsidies. Rules to control the use of subsidies additionally exist on the 
level of WTO. 
Subsidies are regulated within multi-level systems because they can have an effect on compe-
tition between participants in markets2 and on competition between jurisdictions.3 Many at-
tempts have been made to exactly define subsidies.4 However, subsidies have as common de-
nominator that they are steering tools to regulate or influence market behaviour. Often they 
take the form of incentives. These incentives are set by public actors in order to entice private 
actors to act in a manner, which without the subsidy they might not have done. With subsidies 
governments seek to deliver public services and to achieve policy goals. By subsidizing, they 
can reach these goals without providing services themselves and without using ‘traditional’ 
                                                 
2 These markets can be either within or outside of the jurisdiction of the subsidizing government. Due 
to the potential external effects of the practice of subsidization, which exists in all developed and 
most developing countries, subsidies is an area which creates trade friction between jurisdictions 
(the OECD reports that about 20% of all WTO disputes are related to subsidies) and has led to 
strict rules in the EU (Art. 87-89 EC and subsequent secondary legislation).  
3 Especially where subsidies are geared to attract private investment, one government granting subsi-
dies can create an incentive for other governments to offer competing subsidies. Subsidies granted 
on different levels of government can influence each other if they either intend to reach the same 
goals (doubling effect) or intend to reach the opposite goals. If for example one level of govern-
ment would try to solve the problems of low income of participants in a transport market by paying 
subsidies for reduction of capacity and another by subsidizing bigger and more efficient transport 
vehicles. Participants could use one set of subsidies to get rid of their old vehicles and use the next 
set of subsidies to purchase new, bigger transport capacities. The market problems would still exist, 
despite the spending of public resources.  
4 See for example Art 1, 2 SCM.                                                                                                                      3 
 
 
means of public law such as hierarchical command and control structures.5  Subsidies can be 
granted in many forms e.g. on the basis of a statute, by means of contractual or other ar-
rangements between public and private actors. They are often the result of negotiated rela-
tions between the public and private parties. Subsidies thereby are granted within a system of 
close public-private interaction.  
Due to the potential negative effects of the subsidies on public welfare, attempts have been 
made in all multi-level legal systems to control and coordinate the use of subsidies. Also with 
respect to control of subsidies private parties play a crucial role in providing information and 
holding administrations accountable by participating in administrative procedures and con-
trolling the legality of subsidies in Court. Although the mechanisms for control and coordina-
tion differ on each regulatory level, all levels use private involvement to encounter the steer-
ing problems known in principle-agent relations. 6  
Due to these characteristics, subsidies have therefore long been regarded as atypical struc-
tures in public law. The reason for this is that subsidies usually are granted outside traditional 
                                                 
5 An excellent overview over the economic and political motivation for subsidization is contained in 
the OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs Committee on Competition Law 
and Policy Report “Competition Policy in Subsidies and State Aid” of 12 November 2001, 
DAFFE/CLP(2001)24, 7.   
6 See for an overview: Gerard C. Rowe, Servants of the People - Constitutions and States from a Prin-
ciple-Agent Perspective, in: Stefan Voigt and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (eds.), Constitutions, Markets 
and Law, Cheltanham, Northamption, 2002, 287-316. Problems exist e.g. with respect to informa-
tion. Information asymmetries exist in detecting a subsidy, assessing a subsidy and when evaluat-
ing whether a different jurisdiction is complying with. The controlling administration will need to 
employ considerable resources if it wishes to detect all forms of subsidies in all controlled jurisdic-
tions. Also the evaluation of the controlled subsidy programs might be a difficult task and require 
knowledge about local conditions; i.e. is the subsidy achieving a public policy goal with the least 
possible impact on other interests. It might be even more problematic to evaluate whether a juris-
diction has ceased to subsidize after a control procedure. The OECD in its 2001 report on subsidies 
noted at the information problems to be essential in the process of control within multi-level system 
DAFFE/CLP(2001)24, pages 9, 24: “A full analysis of the costs and benefits of different policies 
by a higher level of government requires detailed information about the effects of policies and the 
preferences of the citizens of lower levels of government.” “A sizable component of subsidies and 
aid are granted by sub-national governments. The OECD study on support to industry noted that 
the lack of information on sub-national programmes remained one of the principal problems of the 
study.” Also, problems of the collusion of interest between the controlling and the controlled level 
may lead to the disadvantage of other third party interests (e.g. where the controlling and the con-
trolled level have the same policy objectives but a subsidy will damage interests in yet a third juris-
diction or private interests which are not represented in the control process). Further problems of 
accountability exist. These arise with respect to the relation between different levels of government 
granting subsidies and controlling the subsidizing practice.                                                                                                                      4 
 
 
forms of public administrative law and escape the hierarchic relation between the public and 
the private sphere.  
However, exactly these characteristics may make the law on subsidies appear typical for some 
of the more recent developments in public law - especially with respect to the changing rela-
tion between public and private actors.7 Such developments are: 
-  The development described as the ‘transformation from government to gov-
ernance’.8 Associated with this are problems of controlling and structuring pri-
vate influence in defining and implementing public policy.   
-  The closely related topic of the transformation of regulatory approaches away 
from ‘unilateral’ action (e.g. by administrative acts) to public-private coopera-
tion and forms of ‘negotiated regulation’.9 These forms of cooperation have in-
                                                 
7 An interesting analysis on the usefulness of the selection reference-areas for the study of problems in  
public law: Christoph Möllers, Reform des Verwaltungsrechts - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines 
wissenschaftlichen Diskurses in Deutschland, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2001/10, 51.   
8 In today’s legislation and literature on public administration and political science the term govern-
ance has largely replaced the word government (see e.g. Article 41 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Although not yet formally a part of primary law, the Charter is nonetheless 
one of the sources of fundamental rights for the European Courts, see: Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v 
Commission of 3. Mai 2002, para. 47. See for the political science literature e.g.: Beate Kohler-
Koch and Rainer Eising (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, 1999. 
Also the 2001 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Papers [www.jeanmonnetprogram.org] discussing 
the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance - European Commission, European Gov-
ernance: A White Paper, COM [2001] 428). The definition of the term governance however re-
mains vague. The word is most widely used to describe current phenomena of decision making in 
the field of public law. There, no longer is a strict distinction between the administrative decision 
making bodies and the private actors on the receiving end of such decisions. The inclusion of vari-
ous actors from the ‘civil society’ such as experts, NGOs, private parties into public decision mak-
ing and implementation is one of the main features of the transformation from government to gov-
ernance (Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Gov-
ernance, 8 [2001] Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 369-377). This inclusion goes beyond 
the traditional notion of the ‘right to be heard’ to a more inclusive concept of cooperative decision 
making. With respect to the transformation of public law from governance to government, ques-
tions arise as to the mechanisms of inclusion of the civil society in achieving public goals. Ques-
tions however also arise as to the accountability of the network of actors and the legitimacy of de-
cision-making in such networks. 
9 Privatisation has not necessarily lead to a reduction of public intervention into society. In many 
fields, direct involvement and intervention through action by agencies has been replaced by regula-
tion and/or the creation of financial incentives often in the form of subsidization. This requires that 
there are forms by which the public sphere can gather the information and knowledge for effective 
regulation through cooperation and incentives. The downside of the increased flexibility, these de-                                                                                                                     5 
 
 
creased with the reduction of direct provision of essential services (‘Daseins-
vorsorge’) by public authorities and the trend towards more private provision 
of these services. Public activity is then often reduced to regulatory supervi-
sion, with public authorities setting incentives, controlling the conditions of the 
provision of services and gathering the information for the supervision.10 
- Regulation  within  multi-level legal systems.11 Most regulatory tasks are nowa-
days governed in some sense or another by multi-level questions making it im-
possible to work in closed systems.  
In the following, this paper will therefore present a brief outline of conditions and possibili-
ties for private actors to control public activities with a financial impact through the provi-
sions on the control of subsidies. The goal is to analyse a) the conditions for private involve-
ment in the definition of the use of subsidies and b) the conditions of the involvement of pri-
vate parties into their control.  
                                                                                                                                                          
velopments entail, is that the system of public law and its interaction with the private sphere be-
comes less transparent. Reduced transparency is problematic with respect to holding administra-
tions accountable and therefore is a problem with respect to legitimacy of administrative action. 
Administrations as main public actors traditionally were regarded sufficiently capable of gathering 
the information necessary to undertake their tasks for the public good. But knowledge on condi-
tions within the society and on the market place needed for effective regulation is no longer exclu-
sively gathered by the administrations itself with the help of channelled participation of society ac-
tors. In many jurisdictions it is possible to observe a more far reaching transformation of regulatory 
approaches. As Ladeur puts it: “New forms of co-operative rule making or decision making 
emerge; unilateral decision making by ‘administrative acts’ is more and more replaced by informal 
agreements or explicit forms of contract which make it difficult to distinguish clearly between pri-
vate and public interest” (See: Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Changing Role of the Private in Public 
Governance, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2002/9, 24; Elke Gurlit, Verwaltungsvertrag und Ge-
setz, Tübingen 2000, 17 et seq.; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 [2000] 
NYU Law Review, 547). 
10 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Changing Role of the Private in Public Governance, EUI Working Paper 
Law No. 2002/9, 24-25. 
11 Until the creation and effective enforcement of the subsidy regimes of the  EEC (now the EC, EU) 
and the GATT (and now the WTO) the law of subsidies was limited to the coordination of national 
and subnational levels of governance. Since the 1950ies there has been a continuous momentum to 
fine-tune the provision of subsidies and their supervision in accordance with other regulatory lev-
els. With respect to these problems of multi-level governance, federal states are an interesting 
model to look at. They themselves are organised in a multi-level system with levels of law on the 
federal, the regional and several local levels. Private parties can therefore act on various levels 
within this multi-level system. Developments on the conditions of governance on one level will 
have impact on governance on other levels.                                                                                                                      6 
 
 
For reasons of clarity, the brief analysis of the rules on subsidies will take place on the basis 
of an analysis of the different levels of law: the WTO, the EU, and the different levels of gov-
ernance in Germany. Germany is an interesting field of study for two reasons: Firstly, its legal 
system is marked by a multi-level system of governance in itself. Problems of coordination 
and of control of various providers of subsidies arise also on that level. Secondly, its post war 
legal order addressing the questions of subsidies within the federal system stem from roughly 
the same historic period as the GATT/WTO rules and the EC provisions. Nevertheless it has 
developed a different approach to the issue.  
 
B.  International Level: WTO  
 
Since the WTO lacks the competence to engage in legislation or distributive policies itself, it 
is geared towards the control of the subsidising practice of its members. This brief overview 
over WTO law on subsidies therefore firstly outlines the provisions of substantive WTO su-
bisidies law. It then takes a look at forms of private involvement in the enforcement of those 
provisions. 
 
I.  Overview over WTO Subsidies Law  
Within WTO provisions on subsidies are contained in Art. III (8) (b), VI (3-7) and Art. XVI 
des GATT 1994 and in the „Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures“, SCM.12 
The SCM in turn refers to the WTO provisions on dispute settlement in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, DSM.   
WTO provisions on subsidies come in two categories, called ‘Track I’ and ‘Track II’: Firstly, 
international obligations in the form of substantial provisions which oblige WTO member 
states to act in a certain way or to omit a certain activity (so called Track I provisions). These 
include provisions on reactions in cases of alleged breach of these obligations including dis-
pute settlement procedures. Secondly, unilateral protective measures against the use of subsi-
dies on imported goods and services (e.g. the imposition of countervailing duties, so called 
Track II provisions). 
                                                 
12 The WTO law provisions, on subsidies are parallel to the rules against dumping. Anti-dumping pro-
visions intend to provide safeguards against predatory pricing funded by private actors. The provi-
sions against subsidies intend to safeguard against distortions of competition in world trade due to 
subsidies from other states.                                                                                                                      7 
 
 
The WTO provisions on subsidies are enforced - like all other WTO law - through the mem-
ber states. There is no central agency comparable to the European Commission acting as au-
thority to enforce WTO law. The “Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures” 
under Art 24 SCM has the functions to “afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any 
matter relating to the operation of the Agreement”. It elects a group of experts to provide for 
advisory opinions to panels and the Committee. 
The subsidy related GATT provisions basically deal with Export subsidies. In the original 
GATT 1947 only very few provisions dealt with subsidies. One of the core provisions is Art. 
III (8) GATT which provides for an exception to the principle of equal treatment of all im-
ported and domestic products by allowing the payment of subsidies to domestic production 
only (Art. III (8) (b) GATT).   
Art. VI (3) GATT allows Member States to levy “special duties” on the import of products in 
order to offset the effect of subsidies which these products have benefited from in their coun-
try of origin (Art. 10 et seq SCM contain further elaboration on Art. VI GATT).13      
Art. XVI GATT contains general provisions on subsidies. According to Section A of Art. 
XVI GATT the Member States of GATT provided for a system of mutual notification for cer-
tain types of export subsidies. This obligation has now been redefined in Art. 25 SCM. The 
WTO members are under the obligation to enter into negotiations with those states whose 
could be seriously affected by subsidies as defined in Art. 1, 2 SCM.14 Section B of Art. XVI 
GATT was later added. Under the heading of “Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies” 
which in subpara (3) calls on all WTO members to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of 
primary products.  
Other measures on the subsidies are provided for in the SCM. This is the WTO’s multilateral 
follow-up agreement to the plurilateral Tokyo Round on Subsidies of 1979. It defines the term 
subsidy in a broad sense in Art. 1, 2 and in Part II distinguishes between prohibited and ac-
                                                 
13 These obligations are elaborated also in Art VI (5) GATT which contains a kind of ne bis in idem 
clause, which prevents from one and the same product being subject to countervailing duties for 
subsidies and for dumping. Art. VI (4) GATT forbids sanctioning products because of non-export 
related tax advantages which these products enjoy in their country of origin. Art. VI (7) GATT fi-
nally limits the possibility of sanctions due to systems of protection of domestic producers of pri-
mary commodities under certain conditions. 
14 According to R.R. Rivers, J.D. Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, 11 Law & Policy in International Business, 1979, S. 1447 et seq., at 1460, how-
ever between 1947 and 1979 there was no case of notification under this provision.                                                                                                                      8 
 
 
tionable subsidies. Prohibited are subsidies which by law or fact have the effect of preferring 
domestic over imported goods or are granted inter alia on the basis of the export performance 
of a product (Art. 3 SCM). Actionable are subsidies which can lead to adverse effects to the 
interest of other WTO members (Art. 5 SCM). In case of violations of the obligations under 
these provisions, member states may call for consultations. In the case of the consultations not 
leading to a mutually agreed solution, the member state may call upon the DSB for the estab-
lishment of a Panel. Additionally, WTO members who have suffered damaged, may take 
countervailing measures under Art. 10-23 SCM (Track II). The implementation of the agree-
ment is supervised by a committee of experts. 
According to Art. 30 SCM disputes over subsidy cases will be brought under a procedure as 
defined in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) except as otherwise provided for in the SCM.15 The WTO system of dispute settlement 
has been developed from its GATT origins. Despite the DSU introducing several important 
innovations to dispute resolution within the WTO16 which constitute a great step towards a 
more ‘legal’ in contrast to the former ‘political’ or ‘diplomatic’ mode of dispute resolution, 
the main players are the WTO members. Within this framework the current role of the indi-
vidual in WTO subsidies law is defined. 
 
II.  Private Involvement in Enforcement of WTO Subsidies Law 
The modes of direct participation of private interest in strictly member driven international 
organisation such as the WTO are naturally very limited. Although Art V (2) of the Marra-
kech Agreement under the heading of “Relations with other organisations” states that “the 
General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with 
non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO”, this 
does not mean that NGOs may directly influence WTO policies.17 Private influence on en-
                                                 
15 Annex 2 to the Marakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. 
16 Including the creation of an appellate review of Panel decision by a standing Appellate Body and 
provisions for compensation or retaliation in case a defendant party does not comply with the find-
ing that its practice has been objectionable. See: Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic 
Law, Oxford 2002, 152 et seq. 
17 See: WTO General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organisations, WT/L/162, of 18 July 1996. This accepts only a very limited role for NGOs with re-
spect to the WTO. They are not involved in decision making, but may be consulted. NGOs how-
ever may informally a much greater role than becomes clear from the official text:                                                                                                                      9 
 
 
forcement of WTO law can however either take place through influencing policy within WTO 
members in order to make them force other WTO members to honour their obligations under 
WTO law (1) or taking part within existing disputes (2). 
 
1.  Private Influence within a WTO Member to Enforce WTO Subsidies Law 
There are two possible ways of reaction to an alleged breach of WTO subsidies law: WTO 
members can enforce international obligations of WTO members by entering into the formal 
procedure of consultation. If they do not reach an agreement they can enter into dispute set-
tlement. Also, members can impose unilateral measures such as countervailing duties. 
Under this system, private parties can neither impose countervailing duties nor can they initi-
ate the consultation procedure and subsequent dispute settlements in their own rights. How-
ever, according to some jurisdictions, private parties have the right to request from their gov-
ernment in certain circumstances to act upon a private complaint.18 The DSB has decided a 
case on the extent within which WTO members may empower private parties to initiate dis-
putes under WTO law. The case related to US law which gives private parties far reaching 
rights vis a vis the US government on the issue of the imposition of unilateral sanctions in 
case of violations of trade agreements. 
Under US law the so called ‘Section 301’ of the US Trade Act 1974 provision gives inter-
ested private parties standing to request initiation of formal investigations into trade practices 
                                                                                                                                                          
  I.   Under Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO "the General Council 
may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental or-
ganizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO". II.   In deciding on these guide-
lines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental organizations, Members recognize the 
role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree 
in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs. III.   To contribute 
to achieve greater transparency Members will ensure more information about WTO activities in 
particular by making available documents which would be derestricted more promptly than in the 
past. To enhance this process the Secretariat will make available on on-line computer network the 
material which is accessible to the public, including derestricted documents. IV.   The Secretariat 
should play a more active role in its direct contacts with NGOs who, as a valuable resource, can 
contribute to the accuracy and richness of the public debate. This interaction with NGOs should be 
developed through various means such as inter alia the organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia 
on specific WTO-related issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish 
to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the continuation of past practice of 
responding to requests for general information and briefings about the WTO. V.   If chairpersons of 
WTO councils and committees participate in discussions or meetings with NGOs it shall be in their 
personal capacity unless that particular council or committee decides otherwise.  
18 See below for the US and the EU as examples for approaches to these rights.                                                                                                                      10 
 
 
or policies of a foreign country which conduct an ‘unjustified practice’.19 If the problem is not 
satisfactorily resolved the private party may request from the US government the imposition 
of a remedy against the foreign country including sanctions. Under the US law, the Trade 
Representative is obliged to decide within 45 days after receipt of the petition by the private 
party whether to initiate an investigation into the alleged foreign misconduct. If the investiga-
tion is opened the US Trade Representative has to enter into negotiations with the foreign 
country. If necessary, the Trade Representative is obliged to enter into a dispute settlement 
procedure under WTO law. The Trade Representative’s discretion is limited in case he/she 
finds a violation of an international trade agreement to which the US is party. In that case the 
Trade Representative is obliged to take unilateral responsive action unless the possibility of 
dispute settlement exists. The Trade Representative is not required to take unilateral respon-
sive action on behalf of the US if he/she finds that the foreign country is taking satisfactory 
measures to comply with the recommendations and rules handed down by the DSB.20 Alto-
gether ‘§ 301’ provisions give individuals strong rights with respect to the determination of 
US trade policy. For the US the use and encouragement of individual complaints with such a 
tool allows for a more effective enforcement of trade agreements since the private actors 
within the market place avail of the detailed information of a breach which government agen-
cies will often lack.  
The EC argued that that provision violated Art. 23 DSU.21 The reason was that under § 304 of 
the US Trade Act, the US Trade Representative is obliged to determine whether any rights to 
which the US is entitled are being denied and if so whether unilateral retaliation was neces-
sary within a deadline of 30 days after the date in which the dispute settlement procedure is 
concluded, or 18 months after the initial initiation of the US investigation. Under certain cir-
cumstances these deadlines can be shorter than the possible WTO dispute settlement proce-
                                                 
19 See for details: John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, Alan O. Skyes, Legal Problems of International 
Economic Relations, 3
rd ed., St. Paul, 1995, 815-843; William Kitchell, Leslie Alan Glick (eds.), 
Manual for the Practice of U.S. International Trade Law, Kluwer 2001, 1279-1344; Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2002, 179-188. 
20 § 301 (a) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (a) (2). 
21 Art. 23 DSU stipulates that prior to unilateral action the DSU procedures need to be followed and 
Members need to be afforded reasonable time to implement the recommendations and rules by the 
DSB; United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R of 22 Decmeber 
1999.                                                                                                                      11 
 
 
dure time lines.22 Therefore US law could require the US Trade Representative to take unilat-
eral action on behalf of the US irrespective of whether the DSU procedures had been com-
pleted or not.   
The Panel found § 304 in prima facie violation of DSU rules. If a dispute under the DSU were 
to continue for more than 18 months, the legal security afforded under Art 23 DSU were vio-
lated by the US provision which grants the US Trade Representative discretion whether to 
enact unilateral sanctions or not.23 However the Panel accepted that the US Administration 
had produced a Statement of Administrative Action and had in the proceedings before the 
Panel reaffirmed that it would not apply § 304 of the Trade Act 1974 in violation of Art. 23 
DSU. The Panel therefore concluded that this representation “clarifies and gives an undertak-
ing, at an international level, concerning aspects of domestic US law, in particular, the way 
the US has implemented its obligations under Art. 23 (2) (a) of the DSU.”24 
The EC has similar tools. Regulation 3286/94, the so called Trade Barrier Regulation 
(‘TBR’),25 enables the Community to react upon complaint any natural or legal person, asso-
ciations representing the Community industry or a complaint of a EU Member State about a 
limitation of trade rights encountered by EC actors in foreign trading partners. With respect to 
Subsidies, the EC has a specific regulation, providing for an instrument to protect EC produc-
ers of goods and services against allegedly unfairly subsidized imports.26 Parties which are 
entitled to complain are, as within the scope of the TBR, private parties, associations repre-
senting the Community industry and EU member states.27  The latter in turn can obtain their 
                                                 
22 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2002, 184 gives a in depth analysis of 
the different possible time frames and in which cases the deadlines in the US law could violate 
WTO DSU provisions. 
23 United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R of 22 Decmeber 1999, 
paras 7.56-7.63. 
24 United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R of 22 Decmeber 1999, 
paras 125, 126. 
25  Council Regulation (EC) 3286/94 of 22 December 1994, OJ 1995 L-41/ 54 “laying down Commu-
nity procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the 
Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the aus-
pices of the World Trade Organisation.” 
26 Council Regulation (EC) 2026/97 of 6 October 1997, OJ 1997 L 288/1. A similar regulation exists 
with respect to the defence of community interests against dumping practices. See: Anti Dumping 
(Reg 384/96 of 22 Dec. 1995, OJ 1996 L  56/1. 
27 Art. 9, 10 of Council Regulation (EC) 2026/97 of 6 October 1997, OJ 1997 L 288/1.                                                                                                                      12 
 
 
information from private parties within the member state. According to Art. 10 (8) of the EC 
subsidies regulation, which implements Art. 11 (4) SCM, an investigation will only be initi-
ated if the complaint can be regarded to represent the interest of the Community industry. 
That is the case if it is either not opposed by producers which account for more than 50% of 
the Community producers of a product. At least 25% worth of the Community producers of a 
product need to expressly support the complaint. The Commission after examination of the 
complaint has discretion to initiate an investigation into whether there is an alleged subsidy. 
The discretion is guided by the criteria set out in Art. 10 (4) and (11) of the EC subsidies 
regulation such as de-minimis criteria as to the turnover and minimum evidence requirements.  
If in the initial investigation including the consultation of the state accused of unlawfully sub-
sidizing products, it becomes ‘apparent’ (i.e. it produces sufficient evidence for the existence 
of) that there is a subsidy in violation of WTO law, the Commission ‘shall’ initiate the formal 
proceedings of a ‘countervailing duty investigation’ outlined in Art 10 et seq. SCM. Within 
the period of investigation, private involvement takes mainly place in the provision of infor-
mation helping the European Commission to gather the necessary evidence (Art. 11 of the EC 
subsidies regulation).   
These rules give the Commission a certain degree of discretion about how to act upon a pri-
vate complaint. The degree of Commission’s discretion has been subject to dispute in the ECJ 
- mainly however with respect to the rights of private actors lodging a complaint with the 
Commission in order to secure the adoption of protective measures against foreign dumping 
practices. These cases are informative because EC provisions on the protective measures 
against dumping and subsidising practices provide an almost identical procedures on initia-
tion of an investigation and the investigation of alleged violations of WTO dumping and sub-
sidies provisions to the detriment of EU industries.  
In Fediol III the Court submitted the Commission’s discretionary decision to review of the 
basis of the decision including the Commission’s interpretation of GATT law. “Since the eco-
nomic agents concerned are entitled to rely on the GATT provisions as a basis for the com-
plaint, they may request the Court to review the legality of the Commission’s decision apply-
ing those provisions.” This review however is limited to the decision on the initiation of pro-
ceedings. Since the GATT and now WTO law provides for consultations to be undertaken                                                                                                                      13 
 
 
between the WTO parties, the Commission has a large margin of discretion at to the conduct 
these negotiations and their outcome.28  
The private parties’ rights under EU law are however seem less far reaching than the US par-
ties rights under Section 301 legislation. The European procedures follow a two step proce-
dure according to which the Commission decides on the initiation of proceedings and after a 
positive decision investigates a case. The final decision on the imposition of countervailing 
duties (and for that reason also of anti-dumping duties) rests with the Council which decides 
by simple majority.29  The extent of the Council‘s discretion whether or not to adopt a Com-
mission proposal to impose a duty has been long been subject to disputes in court, few of 
which have so far received close academic attention.30  
In Eurocoton for example, private parties had issued a complaint to the Commission under the 
EC anti-dumping regulation. The Commission after formal examination of the complaint 
found enough evidence to suggest to the Council to adopt a decision imposing anti-dumping 
duties. The central element of dispute was the nature of a Council decision in an anti-dumping 
procedure: Was the Council vote on the imposition of special duties a legislative decision 
with the consequence of only limited review of discretion by the Court? Or did the Council 
decision mark the last step in an administrative procedure, at the end of which the Council 
would be obliged to issue an anti-dumping measure if the facts so required and would have to 
give reasons if it intended to adopt a measure which differed from the reasoned Commission 
proposal. The CFI held that it was “legally impossible” for the Council “to adopt that pro-
posal if only a minority of Member States consider that it should be adopted.”31 It held, that 
the Council could not be obliged to reach a simple majority and therefore to adopt a proposal 
submitted by the Commission. The Council was not obliged to reason its positive or negative 
decision. Advocate General Jacobs, in his opinion on the case disagreed. To him, the Council 
decision has to be subject to judicial review. The fact that the Council could fail to reach the 
necessary simple majority for example would not allow the Council to discharge itself from 
                                                 
28 ECJ Case 70/87, Fediol v Commission, ECR 1989, 1781, headnote 2, para 3 et seq. 
29 Art. 15 of Council Regulation (EC) 2026/97 of 6 October 1997, OJ 1997 L 288/1. 
30 See e.g. Cases T-213/97, Eurocoton v Council, ECR 2000 II-3727; C-76/01, Eurocoton v Council, 
of 30 September 2003; T-58/99, Mukand v Council, ECR 2001 II-2521. 
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the requirement to issue a reasoned decision.32 However, the reasoning that the Council had to 
give in order to comply with its obligations under Art. 253 EC is very brief, the statement that 
the necessary majority has not been reached was sufficient.33  The ECJ finally found that the 
Council, under the anti-dumping regulation acted in an administrative capacity. It acted 
“within a regulatory framework which it has imposed on itself, specifying the conditions in 
which an anti-dumping regulation may be adopted as well as the Council’s room for manoeu-
vre as to whether or not to adopt such measures.”34 If the Council decided not to adopt a pro-
posal for a regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties, “it should provide an adequate 
statement of reasons which shows clearly and unambiguously why, in the light of the provi-
sions of the basic regulation, there is no need to adopt the proposal.”35 Additional criteria for 
judicial review of Council decisions in this area are to “ascertaining whether the procedural 
rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested decision is based 
have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment of 
the facts or any misuse of powers.”36  
Under the EC regulation for the trade policy mechanisms in subsidies, the relation between 
the Commission investigating a case and the Council making a final decision are parallel to 
the approach under the EC anti-dumping regulation. Therefore the case law under the dump-
ing regulation can be applied also with respect to protection against foreign subsidies within 
the EC. 
WTO law also limits the WTO members’ margin of discretion as to the involvement of pri-
vate parties. In US - Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA) the Ap-
pellate Body found that the US, by enacting a statute which provides for the use of counter-
vailing duties collected from subsidised imports to the US, failed to comply with the Art. 32 
(1), (5) SCM.37 The US statute provided that the duties would be offset amongst the private 
                                                 
32 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, C-76/01 P, Eurocoton v Council, of 16 January 2003, paras 79 
et seq. 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, C-76/01 P, Eurocoton v Council, of 16 January 2003, para 
122. 
34 C-76/01, Eurocoton v Council, of 30 September 2003, para 71. 
35 C-76/01, Eurocoton v Council, of 30 September 2003, para 89. 
36 CFI Case T-58/99, Mukand v Council, ECR 2001 II-2521, para 38. 
37 Appellate Body Reports WT/DS217/AB/R and WT/DS234/AB/R, US - Continued Dumping and 
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complainants. Only those parties were eligible to offset payments, which had filed or sup-
ported the original applications for review of foreign subsidies. According to the Appellate 
Body, the SCM was not violated because the US measure had the effect of creating an incen-
tive for US producers to support the initiation of a subsidies investigation by the US authori-
ties. Instead, the AB was of the opinion that the fact that importers of subsidized goods would 
be subject to double disadvantages: First, of countervailing duty payments. Secondly, they 
would also suffer from the fact that US competitors could use the offset of countervailing du-
ties to enhance their position in competition. According to the AB this created a response to 
subsidies not authorised by the SCM and thus illegal under Art. 32 (1) SCM. 
From the point of view of private participation in international subsidies control, the AB’s 
findings are unfortunate. With good reasons the AB could have concluded that the US were 
simply using the public income generated through countervailing duties to create a legitimate 
incentive for private parties to initiate proceedings. Such, the AB explicitly found was a le-
gitimate possibility by the US legislator under Art. 11 (4) SCM. As long as offsetting coun-
tervailing duties does not create a further subsidy to US producers not be compatible with 
WTO law, the AB should have left it to the national legislator to create forms of private in-
volvement. After this ruling, any measure giving real incentives to private party involvement 
needs to be reviewed carefully against the strict threshold the AB has created in its very wide 
interpretation of Art. 32 (1) SCM.  
 
2.  Private Influence in Already Existing Cases 
If consultations between the WTO members on the alleged breach of WTO subsidies rules fail 
within the time period after receipt of the request for consultations, the complainant WTO 
member may request the establishment of a Panel (Art. 4 (7) DSU). The Dispute Settlement 
Body, DSB38 sets up the Panel. In the proceedings before the Panel, the parties to the dispute 
are represented by their governments. It is for the national delegations to decide who is mem-
ber of each single delegation.39  
                                                 
38 The DSB is a specific meeting of the representatives of the WTO membership. THe meeting takes 
place under a separate chairman and with differentiated rules of procedure. 
39 Of course there are several more possibilities of disputes under the WTO DSU such as dispputes 
about compliance (Art. 21 DSU), disputes on compensation and retaliation (Art. 22 DSU). These 
forms of disputes do not give private parties any more extensive rights than the other forms of dis-                                                                                                                     16 
 
 
Proceedings at the dispute settlement are generally confidential. This is a left over from the 
days of the old GATT where dispute settlement took place still in more of a diplomatic at-
mosphere. Even now, the confidentiality of Panel proceedings (Art. 14 DSU) is maintained in 
order to make compromises more easy. Therefore, even when private parties are directly con-
cerned, they will not be permitted to attend or to make submissions, other than as part of a 
WTO member’s delegation.40  
All in all, the WTO dispute settlement system is a WTO member based system. Private inter-
ests will only be represented by a WTO member. The procedural rules of the consultations 
under the SCM and the dispute settlement under the DSU are therefore geared towards public 
actors. As reminiscent to the phase of a more diplomatic approach to dispute resolution in the 
times prior to the WTO, certain procedural rules such as the confidentiality of consultations 
and Panel procedures have remained. Therefore it is very difficult for private actors to tell, 
whether governmental actors representing the WTO members in the dispute represent the pri-
vate interest or whether solutions and compromises reached within the confidential delibera-
tions and negotiations will actually affect them. In the creation of the WTO confidentiality 
was chosen in order to protect the dispute settlement system against lobbying and politiza-
tion.41 One in route to private participation in dispute settlement is the use of WTO govern-
ments to obtain private counsel for the representation of their interest. Since the WTO dispute 
settlement system originally was created as a diplomatic forum, it was not at all clear that 
governments could retain private counsel for their representation. In their 1997 Bananas Case 
report, the Appelate Body allowed the government of Saint Lucia to be represented in an oral 
hearing at the Appelate Body level by private counsel.42 This right has been extended to the 
Panel level.43  
                                                                                                                                                          
pute do. ‚Third party’ involvement in WTO dispute settlement system is possible (Art. 10 DSU). 
‘Third parties’ are parties to the WTO agreements only. 
40 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2002, 153. 
41 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2002, 164. 
42 Report of the Appelate Body in European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras 4-12, of 9 September 1997. The USA had disputed 
the right of Saint Lucia to retain private council for representation in the WTO forum. 
43 Report of the Panel in Indonesia – Ceratin Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
WT/DS54,55,59 64/R, para of 2 July 1998; John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: 
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The possibility of WTO members to retain private council for representation in WTO forums 
however is only a side line to private participation in subsidies disputes on WTO level. Al-
though it is possible that financially potent private entities finance private counsel for small 
WTO member states and thereby influence the issues addressed, such a possibility would 
rather seem far removed from what one might qualify as private participation in the enforce-
ment of WTO subsidies law on a regular basis. 
The main in-route for direct private interest representation within the dispute settlement pro-
cedure has arisen with respect to ‚amicus curiae’ briefs to the Panel. After long dispute in the 
WTO, it is now standing practice that the Appelate Body and Panels have the discretion to 
accept non-solicited amicus curiae briefs.44 Art. 11 DSU, which obliges the Panel to “make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it”, can be regarded to limit the Panel’s discretion 
on whether to take the Brief into account. Insofar as the brief is important for the Panel to 
make an objective assessment of the matter, it will have to do so. Since the obligation to make 
an objective assessment will also expand to the Appelate Body, even though it is not explic-
itly so stated in the DSU, also the Appelate Bodies will have to exercise their discretion in the 
same manner as the Panel vis a vis taking non-solicited amicus curiae briefs into account.45  
As a conclusion of this very brief review of private party involvement in WTO law, it is pos-
sible to state that the regulatory intention of subsidies law on the WTO level is the creation of 
a ‘level playing field’ for international trade. WTO law on subsidies in that respect is essen-
tially international competition law. Private parties play an important role in the enforcement 
of this policy as they can provide the detailed information, which is necessary for WTO 
members’ public authorities to initiate proceedings on the WTO level. The procedural rules 
for the inclusion of private parties in the different jurisdictions differ considerably – as the 
brief overview over some aspects of the US and the EU system showed. 
 
                                                 
44 See e.g. Report of the Appelate Body United States - Import Prohibition of certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Priducts, WT/DS58/AB/R, of 12 October 1998, paras 79-91; for a more recent decision in 
that respect: Report of the Appelate Body United States – Countervailing Measurs Concerning 
Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R of 9 December 2002, 33.  
45 Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The 
Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in: J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, WTO and NAFTA, Oxford 
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C.  Supranational Level: EU 
 
The subject of the last chapter was the possible involvement of private parties in subsidies 
control on the WTO level. That included private involvement in EU investigations into sub-
sidies cases under WTO law.  
This chapter contains an overview over the possibilities of private participation in subsidies 
control and steering on the EU level both by  
-  the EC’s own subsidizing practice (I) and 
-  control of  EU member state subsidies on the basis of Art. 87-89 EC (II). 
 
I. EC  Subsidies 
Unlike state aids from Member State sources, Community aids are directly financed or co-
financed from the EC budget. Community action through the Structural Funds, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), Guarantee Sec-
tion, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the other existing financial instruments is in-
tended to support the general objectives set out in Art. 158, 160 EC.46  
Community actions complement or contribute to corresponding national operations - the so-
called principle of “additionality”47. They are drawn up in partnership between the Commis-
sion and the Member States and the local and regional authorities in cooperation with the “the 
economic and social partners” (Art. 8 Reg. 1260/1999). This partnership covers the prepara-
tion, financing, monitoring and evaluation of assistance. The plans for the distribution of aid 
from the funds is submitted to the Commission by the Member State after consultation with 
the local economic and social partners, who have the opportunity to express their views to the 
national authorities. These have discretion how to take the views of the economic and social 
partners into account. 
In application of the principle of subsidiarity, the implementation of assistance is the respon-
sibility of the Member States and the local and regional authorities. All programs are gener-
                                                 
46 See: Art. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 
on the Structural Funds [1999] OJ L 161/1; European Commission, Ninth Survey on State Aid in 
the EU, COM (2001) 403 final, page 150, Table A. 
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ally co-financed from the national and sub-national as well as the EC level. Each year, the 
Commission undertakes to consult the European-level organisations representing the social 
partners about the structural policy of the Community. Individual decisions on the distribution 
of aid from the EC funds are generally taken on the MS level in single case decisions. Pay-
ments by the EC are generally made out to the MS. These then administer the programs vis-à-
vis the individual recipients of the money. The MS are responsible to set up Monitoring 
Committees to supervise the use of the funds. These committees shall be set up with partici-
pation of the economic and social partners (Art. 35 Reg. 1260/1999). The evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the use of the funds however takes place without formal involvement of the 
economic and social partners. According to Art. 40-43 Reg 1260/1999, the MS and the Com-
mission are in charge of evaluating the success of the programs ex ante, mid-term and ex post. 
These procedures make the Community and the Member States become jointly responsible 
for the definition of tasks to be achieved with the programs. MS aid programs, according to 
the national administrative provisions, may provide for private involvement in the definition 
of tasks. Private interests on the European level are represented through the Economic and 
Social Committee. 
Aids directly administered by the EC’s administration are exceptional. Examples for this cate-
gory are certain aids for research (e.g. the EC framework research programs). Where the EC 
directly administers aids, the payment of a subsidy from a Community fund, according to the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, is an administrative act. Private parties have the right of participa-
tion in the procedure leading to the grant of the aid when and where they are applicants to the 
administrative procedure. Often however in the area of Community aids, the Member States 
or regional bodies are applicants for Community aids. Where private individuals are directly 
involved in the administrative procedures for granting the aid, their rights and duties are de-
fined in the secondary legislation and the individual administrative act leading to the subsidi-
zation. After payment of the subsidy, the Commission (or EC agency) may only revoke its 
subsidy decision “provided that the withdrawal occurs within a reasonable time and provided 
that the institution from which it originates has sufficient regard to how far persons to whom 
the measure was addressed might have been led to rely on the lawfulness thereof.”48      
                                                 
48 ECJ Joined Cases 205-215, Milchkontor, ECR 1983 2633, para 31; Case 14/81, Alpha Steel, ECR 
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There is very little external control of the Community’s own aid policies schemes. The overall 
budgeting of the funds and the steering of single projects takes place in a coordinated ap-
proach between the Commission and the MS. MS involvement is guaranteed by means of 
their involvement in setting up the individual spending projects. Also they are represented at 
the Commission level through advisory and management comitology committees as well as 
an atypical committee – the Art. 147 Committee (Art. 47-51 Reg. 1260/1999). There is very 
little external control of the policy of distribution of aid through EC funds. Individual funding 
decisions are taken on the national level and therefore subject to national Court review. Na-
tional Courts can of course initiate a preliminary ruling under Art. 234 EC.  
European subsidization therefore is characterised by a highly developed system of administra-
tive cooperation in the definition and administration of subsidies from the EC. The few means 
of private involvement are not geared towards control but towards hearing organised eco-
nomic and social interest prior to taking major distribution decisions. These organised inter-
ests are however no longer represented when it comes to evaluating the efficiency and the 
quality of projects.  
 
II.  Private Parties’ Role in the EC Control of State Aid by Member States 
Policing state aid granted by the Member States has the objective of creating equal conditions 
for all participants on the single market and avoid ‘distortions of competition (Art. 3(g) EC). 
State Aid policy is from this perspective central to the single market objective. However, it is 
a regulatory area, which touches the very essence of the political procedures: public spending 
and the definition of the limitation between private and public spheres.  
The control of state aids in the EC rests on a strict ex ante notification requirement.  Any aid 
that does not fall within one of the ‘block exemptions’ needs to be notified with the Commis-
sion.49 This notification requirement is burdensome to the Commission. Although to a certain 
degree similar to the notification requirement in Art. 25 of the SCM, the notification require-
ment of state aids in Art. 88 (3) EC has more legal consequences attached to it. Non-
notification of an aid carries severe consequences for an EC Member State and the individual 
recipient of an aid. Any notifiable aid, which has been granted in absence of Commission ap-
                                                 
49 The Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 enables the Commission to adopt block 
exemptions. So far the Commission has enacted three such block exemptions which came into 
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proval, is classified as unlawful aid. Authorisation can only take place after notification to the 
Commission.  
The Member States originally were not very diligent to follow up on their obligation to notify. 
State Aid control was therefore difficult for the Commission. It was dependent on other 
sources of information about existing and future aid schemes than notification if it wanted to 
enforce EC State Aid policy. The Commission can - with its very limited staff – not assess the 
vast amount of Member States activities, especially given the amount of public activity 
caught by the wide interpretation of State Aid under European law. In order to counter that 
information problem, the Commission sought to make use of the interest and information of 
private parties. This was possible since the ECJ in 1973 had ruled, that the last sentence of 
Art. 88 (3) EC established procedural criteria, “which the national Court could establish”.50 
Therefore they were capable of being directly applied in national courts. Thus in the Saumon 
case, the ECJ drew the conclusion that in case of non-notification of an aid the national courts 
were obliged to offer private claimants protection under national law such as interim meas-
ures, requests for recovery of aid granted in disregard of the notification requirement and 
remedies to possible damages.51 The Commission attempted to further enable private partici-
pation in the implementation of the State Aid regime by increasing the transparency of the 
enforcement criteria in State aid cases. This was attempted by means of the publication of 
guidelines, vademecums and notices explaining the Commission’s approach to state aid poli-
cies.52 
State aid policy is a regulatory area, regulating a vast array of national policy decisions in-
cluding regional aids, structural aids, state guarantees, R&D aid, environmental grants etc. It 
regulates not only individual payment or exemptions of dues to the state but also MS aid 
schemes, which establish the national frameworks of subsidisation. State aid control therefore 
reaches deeply into the review of the MS’ social and tax systems. The Commission has the 
power to require that illegally granted aid be repaid by recipients to the public authorities 
which granted it. 
                                                 
50 Case 77/72, Capolongo, [1973] ECR 611, para 6. 
51 Case C-354/90, Féderation Nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentarires and Syn-
dicat National des Négotiants du Saumon v France, [1991] ECR I-5505, para 12. 
52 Jan A Winter, The Rights of Complainants in State Aid Cases: Judicial Review of Commission De-
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In 1999 the Council issued the Regulation 659/199953 laying down detailed rules for the ap-
plication of Art. 88 (ex 93) EC. The examination of duly notified aid follows a two-phase 
procedure. Within maximum two months after notification (Art. 4 (5) Reg. 659/1999), the 
Commission either decides ‘not to raise objections’ or adopts a decision to initiate Art. 88 (2) 
EC proceedings. If in this preliminary investigation the Commission does not raise objections 
the aid can be implemented by the member state subject to the conditions in Art. 4 (6) Reg. 
659/1999. If the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the proposed aid with the 
single market, it will ‘initiate a formal investigation procedure’ under Art. 88 (2) EC. That 
decision will be published in the OJ. Interested parties54 are invited to comment to the Com-
mission. The formal investigation comes to an end with a final decision by the Commission, 
which will either allow the member state to implement the aid, forbid it to do so, or allow the 
implementation under certain conditions (Art. 7 Reg 659/1999). All decisions are subject to 
review in Court. The addressee of a Commission decisions in the field of State aid however 
remains the Member State (Art. 25 Reg. 659/1999). By acting unanimously, the Council may, 
on application by a Member State, decide that the state aid under investigation by the Com-
mission is compatible with the common market (Art. 88 II third sentence).  
Prior to the adoption of the procedural Regulation 659/1999, the Commission was very much 
in a legal ‘dialogue’ with the Courts as to the shaping and enforcement of state aid policies. 
The position of the individual was thereby to a great degree developed in case law. With the 
procedural regulation 659/99 in force, the Council and EP have entered into the definition of 
the individual’s role in this area.55    
Art. 1 (h) Reg. 659/1999 defines as interested parties any Member State or any [natural or 
legal] person. It lists three types of private parties whose interests might be particularly af-
fected by granting of aid: The beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade asso-
ciations.56 Each of these parties plays a different role in State Aid control on the European 
                                                 
53 OJ 1999 L 83/1. 
54 These are in the definition of Art. 1 (h) Reg. 659/1999 „any Member State and any person, under-
taking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in 
particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade associations.“ 
55 Michelle Cini, From Soft Law to Hard Law? Discretion and Rule-making in the Commission’s State 
Aid Regime, EUI Working Papers RSC 2000/35, 9. 
56 Trade associations had been accepted by the ECJ to be an interested party, see: ECJ Case 323/82, 
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level. Additionally, parties may gain a legal position in the control procedure by issuing a 
complaint. 
 
1.  The role of the Complainant and other Interested Private Parties  
On the European level private parties play an essential role in policing Member States’ aids, 
especially as information resource not otherwise available to the Commission. Therefore, they 
enjoy procedural rights within the State Aid review process which they can enforce vis-à-vis 
the Commission in the European Courts. Additionally, private parties can also enforce their 
rights in national Courts due to the direct effect of Art. 88 (3) EC. 
  
a)  Rights to Initiate a Preliminary Investigation 
Art. 20 Reg 659/1999. Art. 20 (2) states that “any interested party may inform the Commis-
sion of any alleged unlawful aid or any misuse of aid”. Art. 20 (2) grants such an informant 
the right to a reasoned decision as to the Commission’s action in respect to the complaint.57 If 
the information supplied by an interested party lead to an investigation, that party shall re-
ceive a copy of the final decision. Under Art. 20 (2) Reg. 659/1999 the Commission enjoys 
wide discretion as to its decision to enter into a preliminary investigation.  
Individual complainants though have a strong position vis à vis the Commission, since they 
have an enforceable right to a decision on whether the Commission intends to enter into the 
preliminary investigation.58 In the Gestevision and the Max.Mobil cases, the CFI also estab-
                                                 
57 An individual may bring an action for failure to act under Art. 232 (3) EC if the Commission does 
not provide for the answer to the information provided for in Art. 20 (2) Reg. 659/1999. See e.g.: 
Joined cases 166 and 220/86, Irish Cement v Commission, [1988] ECR 6473. With that in the area 
of State Aid law, the Commission is under a more stringent obligation than the Court provided for 
under the Automec case law for other areas of Competition law, see: Case T-24/90, Automec Srl v 
Commission, [1992] ECR II-2223. 
58 Case T-95/96, Gestevisión Telecinco SA v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3407, headnote 1: „Where 
interested third parties for the purposes of Article 93(2) of the Treaty submit complaints to the 
Commission relating to State measures which have not been notified under Article 93(3), the Com-
mission is bound, in the context of the preliminary stage referred to above, to conduct a diligent 
and impartial examination of the complaints in the interests of sound administration of the funda-
mental rules of the Treaty relating to State aid, which may make it necessary for it to examine mat-
ters not expressly raised by the complainants. On completion of that examination, the Commission 
should, in regard to the Member State, adopt a decision declaring that the State measure does not 
constitute aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, or that the measure does constitute                                                                                                                      24 
 
 
lished that in the “interest of sound administration” the Commission has the obligation to in-
vestigate a case beyond the points raised by the complainant and undertake an independent 
research in cases of doubt.59 The CFI explicitly points out that the right to sound administra-
tion is one of the general principles protected by Art. 41 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union which it applies as expression of the rule of law and as com-
mon tradition to the constitutions of the Member States.60 
Individuals can enforce these rights by bringing an action under Art. 232 (3) EC for failure of 
an EC institution to act. The CFI in Gestevision stated that Art. 232 (3) EC must be inter-
preted as entitling individuals to bring an action for failure to act against an institution under 
the same conditions, as they would have been entitled to request the review of an act under 
Art. 230 (4) EC. They would need to show that they would have been concerned by a measure 
of an institution not addressed to them and that the measure is of direct and individual con-
cern to them. That means that “where an undertaking has brought a complaint alleging the 
existence of State aid incompatible with the common market, it must be considered to be di-
rectly affected by the Commission's failure to rule on that complaint where there is no 
doubt that the national authorities intend to implement their plan to grant aid or where the aid 
in question has already been granted.” This, according to the CFI means, that “persons, under-
takings or associations whose interests might be affected by the grant of aid, particularly 
competing undertakings and professional organisations” may bring cases for failure to act 
against the Commission if a Commission decision in the matter would have effected their in-
terests in the matter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
aid but is compatible with the common market under Article 92(2) or (3), or that the procedure un-
der Article 93(2) should be initiated.“ 
59 See on the topic in general: Piet Jan Slot, EC Policy on State Aid: Are the Procedures „User-
Friendly“? The Rights of Third Parties, in: Sanoussi Bilal and Thedon Nicolaides (eds.) Under-
standing State Aid Policy in the EC, Kluwer 1999, 81-97; Jan A Winter, The Rights of Complain-
ants in State Aid Cases: Judicial Review of Commission Decisions Adopted under Article 88 EC, 
[1999] CMLRev 36, 521-568. 
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000, OJ 
2000 C 364/1; Case T-54/99, max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v Commission, [2002] 
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b) Rights in Cases in which a Preliminary Investigation has been 
opened 
If the Commission finds that an aid is compatible with the Common Market in the preliminary 
investigation and therefore does not open the second phase, procedural guarantees afforded to 
individuals can be only properly safeguarded if such parties were able to challenge a Com-
mission decision in Court.61 Interested parties may challenge the Commission’s decision not 
to enter into a second phase in Court if they demonstrate that their competitive position in the 
market is affected.62  
 
c)  Rights in Cases in which the Second Phase has been entered into by 
the Commission 
Interested parties may comment on second phase investigation after their publication in the 
OJ under Art. 6 EC Regulation 659/1999. Those parties will also have the right to present 
their opinion in the oral hearing. Their rights will be safeguarded by the Hearing Officer (HO) 
under his general mandate to provide for procedural rights of the parties involved to be safe-
guarded.63 The HO’s is to safeguard the parties’ rights to a due process.64 The main role of the 
HO is to conduct the hearings during which he is obliged to ensure that the hearing is prop-
erly conducted. He or she is required to ensure the ‘objectivity’ of the hearing itself and later 
that in the draft Decision of the Commission, due account is taken of all relevant facts, fa-
vourable or unfavourable to the parties. 
Interested parties, who were involved in the second phase investigation under Art. 88 (2) EC, 
have the right to receive a copy of the decision taken by the Commission at the end of the sec-
ond phase (Art. 7 Reg. 659/1999).  
                                                 
61 Case T-188/95, Waterleiding Maatschappij v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3713, para 52 et seq; 
Case C-313/90, CIRFS v Commission, [1993] ECR I-1125; Case C-198/91, Cook v Commission, 
[1993] ECR I-2487, para 23; Case C-225/91, Matra v Commission, [1993] ECR I-3203, para 17. 
62 Case T-69/96, HHLA v Commission, [2001] ECR II-1037, para 41; Case C-367/95, Commission v 
Sytraval, [1998] ECR I-2486. 
63 Commission Decision of 23.5.2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competi-
tion proceedings 2001/462, O.J. 2001 L 162/21. 
64 See for details: Themistoklis Giannakopoulos, The Right to be Orally heard by the Commission in 
Antitrust, Merger, Anti-Dumping/Anti-subsidies and State Aid Community Procedures, 24 World 
Competition (2001), pp. 541-569. Practically, a hearing is conducted over a one or two days at 
which Commission staff develop their view of the case, the parties to the case defend their position 
merger, third parties present their observations and Member State representatives ask questions to 
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In Court, competitors and other interested private parties have locus standi for review of the 
Commission’s decision if they satisfy the conditions of Art. 230 EC. The Courts have in the 
area of state aids allowed for a wide definition of acts ‘producing legal effect’ in the sense of 
Art. 230 EC. The decision of the Commission not to open the second phase investigation for 
example has been regarded to produce definitive legal effects and therefore can be the subject 
of an action for annulment for the purposes of Art 230 EC.65  
Individuals claiming locus standi have to convince the Court of them being individually ef-
fected by this act. The Courts have granted standing to interveners within the second phase 
investigation who have submitted comments to the Commission and who could suffer harm 
from the aid being granted by the Member State.66 Parties who have not submitted comments 
during the investigation might still have the right to review of Commission decisions in Court 
if they prove that they are individually concerned by the decision. It is not sufficient to show 
to be a competitor of the potential beneficiary of the aid.67  
Trade associations must be able to show a high degree of involvement and a particular interest 
in acting. The ECJ has accepted such particular interest in cases in which the association was 
set up to represent a specific collective interest and that association has actively entered into 
negotiations on behalf of its members in a case.68 Also, the ECJ has granted trade associations 
locus standi in cases in which single members of the association would have themselves had 
standing.69 
The ECJ is hesitant to grant associations of employees standing to bring cases in Court.70 
However, trade unions and other organisations representing employees can still profit from 
the direct effect of Art. 88 (3) EC and bring in cases in national courts. This was for example 
the case in Sloman Neptun in which an industrial tribunal then requested a preliminary ruling 
                                                 
65 Case C-313/90, CIRFS v Commission, [1993] ECR I-1125. 
66 Case T-380/94, AIUFFASS v Commission, [1996] ECR II-2169; Case C-198/91, William Cook, v 
Commission, [1993] ECRI-2486; Case 169/84, COFAZ v Commission, [1986] ECR 391. 
67 Case T-16/96, Citiflyer Express v Commission, [1998] ECR II-757; Case T-11/95, BP v Commis-
sion, [1998] ECR II-3235. 
68 Case T-380/94, AIUFASS and AKT v Commission, [1996] ECR II-2169; Case C-313/90, CIRFS v 
Commission, [1993] ECR I-1125. 
69 Cases T-447-449 /93, AITEC v Commission, [1995] ECR II-1971 („AITEC I“), para 62.  
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from the ECJ to clarify the question of state aid in a case brought by the representatives of the 
employees of a shipping company.71 
 
d)  Private Rights to Control the Implementation of Commission Deci-
sions 
Private parties can use their rights granted to them as competitors of beneficiaries of aid to 
also control the Commission’s implementation of Commission state aid decisions. In the Ry-
anair case the Commission had originally approved of a plan by the Irish state to grant Aer 
Lingus several tranches of aid under the condition of the completion of a restructuring plan. 
Aer Lingus had not fulfilled all conditions of that restructuring plan but the Commission nev-
ertheless decided to “derogate” from its original decision “and to authorize the Irish Govern-
ment to pay the second tranche of the aid to Aer Lingus”.72 The CFI did not hesitate to grant 
Ryanair, as private competitor of Aer Lingus, standing to bring the case against the Commis-
sion’s decision to allow the Commission’s derogation from the original aid plan. However, 
the Court found that “in the light of a change in external circumstances which occurs after the 
initial decision” the Commission might, under certain circumstances vary the conditions gov-
erning the implementation of the restructuring plan or of its monitoring without re-opening 
the initial procedure under Article 88 (2) EC.73 Therefore the CFI granted the Commission 
wide discretion as to whether it regarded it necessary on the basis of the facts of the case to 
re-open the investigation under Art. 88 (2) EC or whether an alteration of the original deci-
sion was possible. 
 
e)  Rights in National Courts 
Irrespective of a Commission investigation into an allegedly illegal state aid, parties who are 
affected in their rights have the right to bring a case in national courts on the basis of the di-
rect effect of the notification requirement under Art. 88 (3) EC. There the interested party can 
claim the illegality of a non-notified aid and recover damages suffered through the payment of 
the aid. The Commission has issued a notice on the cooperation between national courts and 
                                                 
71 Joined cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, [1993] ECR I-887. 
72 Case T-140/95, Ryanair Limited v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3327. 
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itself in which it outlines the conditions under which it will assist national Courts in their state 
aid cases.74 The ECJ declared in SFEI that the Commission investigation into an alleged case 
of illegal aid can “not release national courts form their duty to safeguard the rights of indi-
viduals in the event of a breach of the requirement to give prior notification”.75 
However, private enforcement of State Aid cases in national courts does to a certain degree 
depend on the Commission and its view on the legal situation. It will be difficult for private 
plaintiffs to convince a national court of the existence of an illegal aid, if the Commission 
does not agree with that interpretation after having been requested to comment on a private 
law suit. 
 
2.  The Intended Beneficiary of the Aid 
Beneficiaries of an intended aid are to a certain degree protected by the Member State grant-
ing the aid. Both – the Member State and the beneficiary – usually agree to apply an aid to 
reach the policy goal intended by the Member State giving the aid. Since the Member State 
avails of a prominent position in the State Aid control procedure, the protection of the benefi-
ciary is indirectly protected.  
Nevertheless, the beneficiary’s legal position is mentioned in the Reg. 659/1999 with respect 
to the obligation of the Member State to recover illegal aid following a Commission decision 
(Art. 14). Beneficiaries of aid are also regarded interested parties in the sense of Art. 1 (h) 
Reg. 659/1999. They have the rights allocated to interested parties with respect to locus standi  
in Court as being directly affected by Commission decision with respect to State Aid in their 
cases. 
 
III. Reasons for the Different Approaches between policing MS State Aids and 
controlling European aids 
The policies outlined above show that there is a striking discrepancy between the approach 
taken on the European level on the involvement of individual interest in designing programs 
for the distribution of EC aid on one hand and the control of MS aid on the other. 
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In the former individual interests are only marginally represented. Where they are represented 
they are limited to the advising national authorities in the design and targeting of aid-worthy 
projects. The individual influence is again ‚softened’ by allowing individual influence only by 
means of organized interest through employers’ organizations, trade unions and other ‚eco-
nomic and social partners’.  
The difference to the use of individual information and incentives for their control of MS aid 
is striking. In the latter area, individuals are an essential factor in an effective administration 
of the EC’s State Aid policy. 
There are of course several possible explanations for this striking difference. One is certainly 
that State Aid policy under Art. 87-89 EC is part of competition policy. The administration of 
funds is part of single policy areas where the EC has very little real regulatory power other 
than influencing developments by distributing funds. Given the requirement of cooperation 
with the MS and the principle of ‚additionality’ of aid, close administrative cooperation in-
stead of the more confrontational approach in competition policy seems to be approach cho-
sen for governing within the multi-level policy areas of social, regional and cohesion policies 
as well as in agriculture and other targets of aid. 
 
D.  National and Sub-national Levels: Germany’s Federal, Länder and Local Levels 
 
State Aids are mainly granted on the national and sub-national levels. Obviously, MS differ in 
their internal organization. Within federal states such as Germany, they can be granted on 
basically three levels: the Federal level, the Länder level or one of the municipal levels. Aid 
can also be granted by additional sources such as private bodies controlled or influenced by 
the public sector.    
Control of State Aids granted by these levels within Member States takes place through EU 
law and through the law of the Member State itself. EU law overarches MS law insofar as it 
controls all forms of MS aid no matter which level of government grants the aid. 
Where MS mechanisms of state aid control exist, they are generally additional to EC law. 
MS’s State aid then has to comply with both standards of control. MS law is the exclusive 
criteria of control only in exceptional cases: When EC law is not applicable due to ‘block ex-
emptions’ or if the aid is de minimis under EC law and therefore not subject to control on that 
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Germany is an interesting case study to review in conjunction with WTO and EU law not 
only because its law governing subsidies and state aids stems from roughly the same histori-
cal period (post-world-war-II-period), also it itself has a multi-level systems of granting and 
controlling aid. 
The following section outlines the control mechanisms for State Aid in the different levels 
within the German federal multi-level system in broad strokes. 
 
I.  State aid control in the German Federal System 
Most national systems within the EC do not avail of a system of control of State Aids in the 
same manner as EC law provides. In Germany’s multi-level system there are mechanisms of 
control of State Aids but that control does not take place through a hierarchic authorization by 
a central agency. Instead aid grants are coordinated by means of administrative cooperation.  
The Federal level and the Länder for example in some matters are responsible for subsidiza-
tion programs in a joint responsibility, for example in the cases of Art. 91a and 91b of the 
German constitution (‘Grundgesetz’, GG), which define certain areas of common responsi-
bilities (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgaben’). Also the federal level may co-finance investment desig-
nated by the Länder. Generally however, the Federal and the Länder level have clearly dis-
tinct areas of genuine competencies within which they not only have the right to legislate but 
also to achieve policy goals by means of subsidization. Where the Länder have the compe-
tence for subsidization on their own, they report to the Federal level the extent of their subsi-
dies programs. The federal government compiles these reports in its own bi-annual reports on 
subsidies which it is obliged to assemble under § 12 II of the law for the promotion of stabil-
ity and growth (‘Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums’, WStG  of 1967).76 
Looking at the relation between the two levels in an overview, with respect to subsidies, the 
federal and the Länder level interact less on the basis of mutual or hierarchic control than on 
the basis of a cooperative system.77 This system is less oriented towards reducing the overall 
amount of subsidies but to coordinate the subsidies in order to guarantee that they are spent 
                                                 
76 Gesetz vom 8.6.1967 (BGBl I 582). The last report under this obligation is the:ß Achtzehnter 
Subventionsbericht, Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Entwicklung der Finanzhilfen des 
Bundes und der Steuervergünstigungen 1999-2002, August 2001, 
www.bundesfinanzministerium.de. 
77 See especially the provisions of the German constitution such as Art. 91a, 91b, 104a IV Grundge-
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without creating a culture of competition of subsidization, in which the effect of different sub-
sidies from different regions would be reduced. 
In relation to the local level, the Länder often have the right to control the legality vis-à-vis 
the different levels of local bodies’ activities (‘Rechtsaufsicht’). In many Länder, local budg-
ets require the prior authorization of the competent Länder authorities. This control which is 
oriented at the legality and in part in the requirement of an economic use of public means of-
ten suffers from information deficit of the higher level authorities and from identities of inter-
est when it comes to subsidization of economic activity within a region.78   
 
II.  The Role of Private Parties in the Control of Subsidies in Germany 
Within such system of administrative cooperation for the control of subsidies there seems lit-
tle room for private involvement in the control of subsidies. In fact, the private influence in 
the choice and the definition of subsides is limited mostly to the potential beneficiary who 
will exercise his influence by lobbying for good conditions for subsidization. Where subsidies 
are granted on the basis of a contract between the public body and the individual, there will be 
extensive participation by the beneficiary in the negotiation of the terms of the contract. Al-
though subsidies should be used to reach goals which are in the public interest with the help 
of a private party, it has been observed that the paradox of subsidies is that politically they are 
often less of an intervention of the state in private affairs but of private interests making use 
of state resources.79 
Given the lack of formalized institutional process of a review of subsidies on the federal or 
the Länder level in Germany, there is much less possibility of private involvement of the ad-
ministrative procedure of the review of state aid than there is under Art. 88 EC procedure on 
the European level.  
Nevertheless, individuals - especially competitors - enjoy extensive protection under the fun-
damental rights guaranteed under the GG. Amongst them are ‘defense rights’ against direct or 
indirect public interference in individual private affairs. Those are the right to ownership (Art. 
14 GG), the right to exercise a chosen profession (Art. 12 I GG) and the subsidiary right to act 
free from public intervention as long as that intervention is not based on a law allowing the 
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state to undertake this intervention (Art. 2 I GG). Private parties additionally have the right to 
defend themselves against discrimination and to actively seek equal treatment (Art. 3 I GG).80 
The latter right is thus generally used not so much to intervene against the subsidization of a 
competitor but more to be granted an equal subsidy as a competitor.81 The combination of this 
right to equal treatment in combination with a wide interpretation of the principle of the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations can lead to a strong position of individuals and serve as a 
legal basis for the claim to receive subsidies.  
Although in the German federal legal system different levels of authorities are involved in 
granting subsidies, the administrative procedural law is harmonized within Germany. An 
overview over private rights can therefore be given without detailed review of the individual 
Länder and local legal structures. One of the essential aspects of the enforceability of private 
rights is standing of private parties. The rules on standing to request a formal review of an 
administrative decision to grant a state aid or to instigate a review of such decision in Court 
are both regulated under the German code on judicial procedures in administrative matters 
(Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, VwGO).  
Under that system, private parties have the right to a formal review of an administrative deci-
sion and may – in case of a negative outcome of their complaint with the administration – 
have standing in Court only in cases in which they can claim that their own individual rights 
(‘Subjektive öffentliche Rechte’) have been violated by a public decision to grant a state aid. 
The right to a review of the public decision exists only in so far as the rights are affected. In-
dividuals do not have the right to a general review of the legality of public decisions beyond 
the protection of their individual rights. 
Individual rights, which a private party can defend, can stem from  
-  a contractual relationship with the authority, 
-  an administrative act (whether this is either directly addressed to the private 
party or it is addressed to a third party but nevertheless has direct or indirect 
effects on the rights of the private party), 
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-  a statute or  
-  a fundamental right position.  
The first two sources will usually give rights mainly to the potential beneficiary of the aid. 
The individual rights of the competitor are either his/her specific interest addressed in the 
statutory basis for a subsidy82 or the fundamental rights of the competitor against public inter-
ference in the market conditions.83 
Under this system, the private parties, which have standing to request the review of a state aid 
decision, are usually either the beneficiary or a competitor. Other third parties only in very 
exceptional cases will be able to argue that their rights are affected by a state aid decision.84 
Interest groups such as consumer groups or trade associations rarely have standing to bring 
cases and thereby exercise control over public action. Associations only have standing, in 
cases in which there is an explicit statutory provision allowing them to bring a case. In the 
area of economic law or subsidies control this is – to my knowledge – not the case.85 
Once the private party has established standing, the public decision to grant an aid can be de-
clared fully or partially void if that decision either  
-  does not have a sufficient legal basis or  
-  if it does, does not comply with the legal basis and  
-  if that violation affects the individual rights of the competitor.86  
If the competitor’s rights can be protected by other means than declaring the public decision 
void, the Court can also amend the administrative decision or order the administration to 
                                                 
82 See e.g.: BVerfGE 80, 124 dealing with a case on the legality of subsidies granted for the distribu-
tion of newspapers through the German postal service. The constitutional court in that case had to 
decide about the guarantee of the right to freedom of expression (of the non-subsidised newspa-
pers) and the freedom of public interference in the marketplace for newspapers; Gesetz über 
Maßnahmen zur Förderung des deutschen Films (Filmförderungsgesetz) of 1993 with amendments. 
83 Peter Badura, Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in: Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann (ed.), Besonderes 
Verwaltungsrecht, 11th. edition, Berlin, New York, 1999, 285. 
84 This is the essential test a Court will undertake when reviewing whether a private party has standing 
in Court under § 42 II VwGO. 
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amend the decision. Generally the Court would order to include certain conditions which 
would protect the private interests of the third parties.  
Private parties can - under certain conditions - request the public authority, which granted a 
subsidy, to reclaim the payment if the subsidy proves to have been illegal. However, the pri-
vate party’s rights in such a case are limited to the right to the authority’s decision on whether 
or not to reclaim the subsidy. The reason for this is that the authority in its decision whether 
or not to reclaim the subsidy has to balance the rights of the party to which the subsidy was 
awarded (especially with their legitimate expectations) with the rights of other parties. That 
balancing of interests entails a discretionary decision. 
To summarize, Germany grants and controls state aid on the national level, the Länder level 
and the local levels. Although the interpretation of the fundamental rights afforded under the 
GG also includes economic rights, they are enforceable only by parties directly affected by a 
subsidy. That excludes the enforcement of such rights by business or consumer associations. 
There is no formalized administrative control-procedure on the national or sub-national level, 
which would allow for individual participation in the controlling state aid. Instead, the deci-
sions to grant state aids are taken in close administrative cooperation between the different 
levels of government in Germany. These two factors limit the amount of individual involve-
ment into state aids control on the national and sub-national level in Germany. 
 
E.  Private Involvement in Subsidy Control – Some Conclusions 
 
An analysis of private participation in the control of subsidies and state aid seemed interesting 
inter alia for the reason that the very features, which made the law of subsidies seem atypical 
for traditional public law, could make it a typical area of reference for challenges of modern 
public law. Especially important in this context are firstly, the close relation between public 
and private parties in the area of subsidies, which replaces traditional hierarchic forms of pub-
lic action. Secondly, the multi-level regulation of the area of subsidies law. Within the levels 
of regulation (WTO, EU, national) we find administrative cooperation to coordinate and to 
mutually control the different subsidies’ regimes. The analysis of the different levels of law of 
subsidies helps to unlock the experience gathered in this area of subsidies law which can be 
valuable for comparison with regulation in other policy areas taking place under similar con-
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The multi-level nature of the law of subsidies creates a certain complexity of legal relations, 
both with respect to laws coordinating subsidies and laws on control of subsidization within 
the multi-level system. The multi-level nature of subsidies law leads to an increase in admin-
istrative cooperation and interaction. Administrations try to fine tune their subsidies policies 
by way of coordination in administrative networks.87 This cooperation and networking leads 
to a certain complexity of relations within the multi-level structure. That may pose a chal-
lenge for transparency of decision-making powers and therefore for the accountability of ac-
tors. 
Administrative cooperation and networking can however be constructed in very different 
ways. The comparison showed that two basic models exist:  
One is used for the distribution of the EC’s own funds and was the model we found in Ger-
many. Under this model, rules on subsidies are created as rules on administrative cooperation 
in charge of distributing of a given budget. In this capacity, administrative cooperation - 
sometimes including some forms of representation of organised society interest - does not 
control subsidization but decides on how subsidies are spent. These structures do not so much 
ask whether a subsidy should be granted but more under which conditions and for what.  
These structures primarily try to steer the spending of a given amount of money. This type of 
approach can be observed in the rules governing the distribution of European funds and in the 
German system of federal administrative cooperation. The approach is to try to reach mutual 
consensus. Individual interests, which are negatively affected by these majoritarian, consen-
sus-driven decision structures can usually only rely on non-discrimination clauses to also ask 
for subsidies.  
                                                 
87 Administrations may negotiate solutions to disputes on the WTO level prior to a dispute entering 
into the formal dispute settlement arena. On the EU level, the administrative cooperation takes 
place mainly in the realm of the creation of subsidies programs financed by the EU through the EC 
funds (structural, regional, agriculture). The control of national and sub-national subsidies within 
the EU level contains a certain degree of administrative cooperation, which starts with notification 
of aid. The Commission, when investigating infringements of Articles 87 et seq EC can enter into 
negotiations with the national level in order to find satisfactory solutions to the problematic issues. 
The Commission can to a certain degree indirectly harmonize national subsidies decisions. The dis-
cretion it has been granted by the EC treaty has led to ‘soft law’ instruments. The Commission is-
sues ‘guidelines’, ‘notices’ and ‘communications’, which outline the exercise of the Commission’s 
discretion which it will exercise when reviewing national subsidies programs. National subsidies 
programs will therefore be designed to comply within these programs. Without external control, the 
administrative cooperation can lead to a very close relationship between the administrations. Such 
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The counter-model is less consensus-driven. Instead it is more adversary by nature. It creates 
an additional structure to the administrative networks deciding on how to spend a subsidy 
budget. This additional structure is a kind of  ‘arbitrator’ agency analysing whether a certain 
subsidy complies with overall policy guidelines. The most prominent structure of this kind in 
international subsidies control is the Commission enforcing Art. 87, 88 EC. To a certain de-
gree this function is also fulfilled by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism or by WTO 
member states’ agencies such as the US Trade Representative.  
If entrusted with the task of reviewing the policy itself in a kind of inquisitory approach such 
an independent arbitrator has several obstacles to overcome: These contain the capacity to 
obtain and compute the information on subsidization. They also contain the problem how to 
enforce the decisions.  
The information problem is considerable in the area of subsidies and state aids. Setting the 
correct incentives in order to activate self-controlling developments can therefore be a key to 
finding adequate solutions.   
Within the law of subsidies these information requirements of the independent control agency 
have been met mainly by employing external information sources: The interested private par-
ties. Private parties have the advantage that they often have more information than controlling 
levels of administrations. They are therefore capable of detecting potential violations of rules 
on a very detailed level. However, tapping into this resource of private information comes at a 
cost for the administration. Individuals will only engage in the time and resource consuming 
exercise if they have an incentive to do so. In the legal systems reviewed in this paper such 
incentives range from granting individuals procedural rights and involvement to the US ap-
proach to offset the financial profits from levying countervailing duties. 
The approach to include individuals has an additional effect: Since individuals are offered 
procedural rights these rights can be enforced in Courts. The European Courts have over the 
past 30 years adjudicated on the rights of individuals. These often been abstracted in part 
from general principles of the law (e.g the principle of ‘sound administration’). By doing so 
the Courts have established themselves in their role to supervise and control the administra-
tion, which in turn controls MS’s subsidies. The inclusion of individual parties into the proc-
ess of control has thereby lead to an overall strengthening of judicial control with respect to 
public use of subsidies. 
The information and control function which individuals exercise can be seen as to benefit the 
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ministration. In that respect, the ‘price’ the administration paid in involving private parties is 
a valuable investment. 
That being so, the use of the individual’s interest might be further strengthened by granting 
open access to public information. Public administrations have traditionally been conceived 
of as collectors of information. This information created the basis of independent administra-
tive decisions. Means of ‘Freedom of Information’ procedures could enhance the private par-
ties’ capabilities to contribute to a transparent and accountable administration. The EU has in 
the past made steps in the direction of introducing information transparency in order to ac-
commodate this. Other legal systems like the German not yet have introduced this feature to 
date on all levels.   
The basic critique on an agency based review of state aids has traditionally been that it is un-
democratic to allow for ‘a few un-elected burocrats’ to be allowed to overturn democratically 
made decisions on how public affairs should be run and public money be spent. This critique 
has been voiced in different versions with respect to the Commission when exercising state 
aid control and is voiced as critique of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 
However, when reviewing the development with the involvement of individuals in state aid 
and subsidies control, it appears that that involvement goes hand in hand with the develop-
ment of  a more sophisticated structure of checks and balances controlling why and whether 
subsidies will be paid. The inclusion of individual interests in that process adds a different 
source of legitimacy to public decision-making – that of the direct involvement of affected 
parties.  
Additionally, the fact that the regulation takes place on several levels can strengthen the posi-
tion of individuals affected by subsidy and state aid decisions. Especially individuals who 
would be negatively affected by subsidies to third parties. Individuals affected by subsidies 
can seek protection not only within their home jurisdiction but can to a certain degree chose 
on which level of jurisdiction to seek for their protection. On the different levels of jurisdic-
tion individual interest can also be represented by means of arbitration. 
It appears that in the area of subsidies review and control, which is an area in which the multi-
level nature of a policy area goes hand in hand with complex regulatory problems involving 
information and compliance issues, a more adversary procedure is more capable of balancing 
and including the relevant interests than mere administrative cooperation with some input by 
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Why then, might one ask, has Germany with its internal multi-jurisdictional system not taken 
that approach? Why are the German structures not open towards the inclusion of individual 
interests at all stages of the procedure? A possible answer could be that during the last 30 
years, the EU has continuously taken over the role of an independent review institution to 
such a degree that there would be no need for doubling that function on the national level. 
Another possible explanation could be that the Germany has missed to take the initial step to 
create some form of procedural provision on the federal level for an independent review of 
subsidies on the national and sub-national level. Therefore, in Germany, no agency has an 
interest in employing individuals and courts couldn’t enforce procedural rights.   
The short overview over forms of private involvement in subsidies law in this paper showed 
that there are some core factors, which make private involvement viable: 
-  In order to be able to correctly assess a situation a third private party can gain 
by access to information on subsidies. Freedom of information provisions and 
far reaching right of access to files on all levels of government will improve 
the transparency for private parties which are interested in using their specific 
knowledge to help control subsidy policies. 
-  Individuals need to be granted procedural rights in existing administrative 
control and coordination procedures.88 Procedural rights provide that private 
parties may request the review of a subsidy program. They might substantiate 
the right to be heard in procedures, which will lead to the granting of subsidies. 
They might also define how the private input must be taken into account in an 
administrative decision related to subsidies. 
-  Individuals must also have substantive rights of defence against subsidies 
granted to others. In combination with procedural rights, such substantive 
rights can allow private parties to request a certain level of review.  
-  Private parties can only defend these procedural and substantive rights if they 
have means to enforce them. Standing in Courts to defend substantive and pro-
cedural rights are key to the enforceability of private rights in this respect. The 
provision of effective and fast judicial review to administrative decisions can 
                                                 
88 On the European level this is dealt with e.g. in Regulation 659/99.                                                                                                                      39 
 
 
help the private parties to exercise their control rights and other effected par-
ties to reach legal certainty.   
-  Private parties will only invest the time and recourses needed to enforce their 
rights, if they have sufficient incentives to do so. Incentives, which are granted 
in the area of subsidies are e.g. the rights to request a public body to reclaim 
the illegal subsidy. In some cases also the right to ask for the same subsidiza-
tion is an incentive for private involvement. Entitlements to damages and par-
ticipation in penalty payments may be an additional potential incentive.89  
-  Finally, in some cases provisions must be made to allow for private parties 
with ‘diffuse interest’ to involve themselves. This is a need if the incentives of-
fered to the individual are not strong enough to justify individual action (such 
as for example standing in court for interest representation such as by business 
associations, consumer groups, trade unions, other NGOs with an interest in 
the matters).  
 
This study therefore takes the view that the involvement of private interest in subsidies and 
state aid control is beneficial for the public on all levels of the multi-level system of subsidies. 
However, the inclusion of private parties is helped by the creation of certain administrative 
structures, which goes hand in hand with creating systems of checks and balances for the con-
trol of public spending within legal systems. For the three levels which have been reviewed in 
this paper this could mean the following:  
The WTO level could profit from the WTO members or the dispute settlement procedure 
opening itself to private parties and granting them formalised procedural rights. The EU level 
has been very successful with its approach in including private parties with respect to review 
of MS state aid. One might however criticise that the Commission combines investigative and 
adjudicative functions. With respect to the EC’s own subsidies, the EC is still far behind the 
possibilities of including individual interest. The structures for distribution of EC funds are 
very much like the structures in the German multi-level system. They are geared towards a 
simple distribution of a given budget. The latter approach stays behind the possibilities of 
good governance in the area of subsidies. 
                                                 
89 See above in Chapter B II with reference to the Appellate Body Reports WT/DS217/AB/R and 
WT/DS234/AB/R, US - Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000, of 16 January 2003. Institute for International Integration Studies
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